RONALD DWORKIN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

Abstract

Abstract: This article is part of the contemporary debate between law and philosophy, highlighting the need for legal philosophy to transcend the exclusive domain of philosophers. Thus, it proposes an approach that combines philosophy with a more accessible language to problematize the “fetish” of “purê” law, this is, the belief that law is merely what judges say it is, based on pragmatic and performative decisions. Countering this judicial optimism, the analysis focuses on the contribution of Ronald Dworkin, specifically his theory of judicial decision-making, guided by coherence and integrity. Integrity is presented as a necessary condition for decisions in hard cases, where the judge casts a “vote for one of law's Dreams” (Dworkin, 2014b, p. 488). The relevance of this discussion is underscored by the currency of sensitive issues (bioethics, identity issues, political rights) and controversies surrounding the actions of the Judiciary (Supreme Federal Court), especially concerning accusations of invading the legislative sphere in the name of democratic preservation. These morally charged issues renew the philosophical interest in law. Dworkin’s text, which integrates morality into law in its descriptive and prescriptive dimensions, serves as an invitation to debate the content and form of judicial decisions.

Keywords: Dworkin; philosophy of law; theory of judicial decision; integrity; coherence.